![]() ![]() ![]() Whenever the active dynamics of links is sufficiently fast, population structure leads to a simple transformation of the payoff matrix, effectively changing the game under consideration, and hence paving the way for reciprocators to dominate defectors.We derive analytical conditions for evolutionary stability. Links can be broken off at different rates. Moreover, once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Unlike the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, where individuals meet at random and have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions, we consider a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. ![]() Individuals occupy the vertices of a graph, undergoing repeated interactions with their partners via the edges of the graph. Here we examine the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity in dynamically structured populations. Direct reciprocity relies on repeated encounters between the same two individuals. ![]()
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